The History of Appeasement in International Relations

In the grand theatre of international relations, where nations posture and maneuver like chess pieces on a global board, one strategy has consistently resurfaced, often leading to disastrous consequences: appeasement. It’s a diplomatic policy born from a desire to avoid conflict, a seemingly rational choice to make concessions to an aggressive power in the hope of achieving peace. Yet, history frequently teaches us that offering the hand of compromise to a predator often only whets its appetite.

The term “appeasement” often conjures images of Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, returning from Munich in 1938, waving a piece of paper and proclaiming “peace for our time.” He had just conceded the Sudetenland, a border region of Czechoslovakia with a significant German-speaking population, to Adolf Hitler. The hope was that by satisfying Hitler’s territorial ambitions, the insatiable hunger of Nazi Germany would be sated, and a wider war could be averted. This act, however, is now widely seen as a prime example of appeasement gone terribly wrong.

A sepia-toned photograph of Neville Chamberlain holding up a document, smiling, with Adolf Hitler st

To understand appeasement, we must first grasp the historical context in which it arises. The trauma of World War I, a conflict that had shattered European society and claimed millions of lives, left an indelible mark on the collective psyche of many nations. The sheer scale of the slaughter and destruction engendered a profound aversion to war. This desire for peace, coupled with economic instability in the aftermath of the Great Depression, made aggressive military action seem like an unthinkable prospect for many governments.

Furthermore, the rise of totalitarian regimes in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, presented a new and daunting challenge to the established international order. These regimes, fueled by ideologies of expansionism and racial superiority, were not interested in the traditional diplomacy of compromise. Their aims were fundamentally revisionist, seeking to overturn the post-World War I settlement and establish their dominance.

Key actors in this drama included not only the appeasers like Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, but also the aggressors, Hitler and Mussolini, and the nations that were the targets of their aggression, such as Czechoslovakia and Austria. From the perspective of the appeasers, the risks of confronting these aggressive powers were immense. They feared another devastating war, their populations were war-weary, and in some cases, they harbored a degree of sympathy for some of the grievances articulated by the revisionist powers (for instance, the perceived unfairness of the Treaty of Versailles).

The actual events of appeasement in the lead-up to World War II are a chilling narrative. In 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia). The League of Nations, the international body designed to prevent such aggression, imposed economic sanctions, but these were too weak to be effective, and Italy ultimately succeeded in its conquest. This failure emboldened Mussolini and demonstrated the weakness of collective security.

Then came the Rhineland remilitarization in March 1936. Hitler sent troops into the demilitarized zone along the Rhine River, a direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties. France and Britain protested, but ultimately did nothing. This was a critical moment; had France acted, it might have been able to force Hitler to back down. Instead, Hitler saw that he could defy the established order with impunity.

The Anschluss, the annexation of Austria by Germany in March 1938, followed. Again, international protests were voiced, but no action was taken. This emboldened Hitler further and brought him closer to Czechoslovakia, a nation that he now openly coveted.

The climax of this policy was the Munich Agreement in September 1938. Chamberlain and Daladier met Hitler and Mussolini and agreed to the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Czechoslovakia, abandoned by its allies, had no choice but to accept. Hitler promised that this was his last territorial demand.

Of course, this promise was broken within months. In March 1939, Germany occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, and in September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, triggering the Second World War. The policy of appeasement had utterly failed. Instead of preventing war, it had only delayed it and made it far more costly, as it allowed Germany to grow stronger and more confident.

A somber, black and white image depicting the desolate ruins of a European city in the aftermath of

The consequences of appeasement were catastrophic. World War II became the deadliest conflict in human history, resulting in an estimated 70-85 million fatalities. It led to the Holocaust, the systematic genocide of six million Jews and millions of others by the Nazi regime. The geopolitical map of the world was redrawn, and the Cold War ensued.

Analyzing appeasement reveals a complex interplay of factors: the deep-seated fear of war, miscalculations about the nature of aggressive dictatorships, and a failure to understand that some ideologies are fundamentally incompatible with peaceful coexistence. It serves as a stark historical lesson about the perils of concessions made to unchecked ambition. The hope of buying peace with territory or concessions often proves to be a false economy, as it can embolden aggressors and ultimately lead to a far greater conflagration.

While the context of appeasement in the 1930s was unique, the lessons learned remain profoundly relevant today. The question of how to deal with aggressive states that disregard international norms and threaten the peace continues to be a central challenge in international relations. The history of appeasement serves as a cautionary tale, reminding us that while diplomacy and de-escalation are crucial, they must be pursued with a clear-eyed understanding of the adversary and a steadfast resolve to uphold core principles and international law.